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THE MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
Jamal Greene*
Substantive due process is notoriously regarded as a textual
contradiction, but it is in fact redundant. The word "due" cannot
be honored except by inquiring into the relationship between the
nature and scope of the deprived interest and the process-whether
judicial, administrative, or legislative-that attended the
deprivation. The treatment of substantive due process as an
oxymoron is what this Essay calls a constitutional meme, an idea
that replicates through imitation within the constitutional culture
rather than (necessarily) through logical persuasion. We might
even call the idea a "precedent," in the nature of other legal
propositions within a common law system. This Essay explores the
intellectual and social history of the substantive-due-process-as-
contradiction meme and argues that it is often appropriate for
judges to rely upon such memes even if their underlying claims lack
analytic integrity. Judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases is
best understood as an act of translation between the decisional
process of the judge and the representations necessary to validate
the decision within the constitutional culture.
INTRODUCTION
Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms.'
Indeed, it is redundant. No inquiry into the propriety of some
process-its "due"-ness-is or can be indifferent to the substance
of the associated loss. Due process contemplates a rule of reason
that calibrates the relation between, on one hand, the nature and
* Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Brandon
Garrett, Risa Goluboff, Kent Greenawalt, Jill Hasday, Leslie Kendrick, Henry Paul
Monaghan, Mark Walters, Ryan Williams, and workshop participants at Columbia Law
School, Queen's University Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and
William & Mary Law School for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
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scope of a deprivation and, on the other, the process that attends
it.2 For some deprivations, a simple majority vote in the legislature
and the signature of the executive is sufficient process; for others,
more, even a constitutional amendment, may be required. It
would beg the question to pronounce, tout court, that any
particular legislative process is always constitutionally adequate.
It would turn the word "due" into surplus.3
It has somehow become common ground across the
ideological spectrum that a textual analysis of this sort fails.'
These days, the most damning charge against substantive due
process is not that it gets the history wrong or that it unduly
empowers judges, both of which might be accurate, but rather that
it abuses the English language, which is not. Part of this Essay's
project, then, is to shift the terrain on which the battle over the
Due Process Clause is waged. Standing alone, the constitutional
text supports substantive due process because the word
substantive, to repeat, is redundant. Part I makes this case. It
argues that neither "substantive" nor "procedural" due process
holds superior title to the phrase "due process of law" or, at the
least, that staring at the Constitution contributes nothing to the
argument.'
2. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1970).
3. See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of
Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 330 (2012) ("A procedure-only approach
to due process cannot account for the meaning of the word 'due.').
4. See id. at 284 ("[F]or decades it has been a commonplace of law schools that
substantive due process is an oxymoron . . . ."). In addition to Ely, see, for example, Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process "the
ubiquitous oxymoron"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) ("The notion that a constitutional
provision that guarantees only 'process' before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or
property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most
casual user of words."); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEw BIRTH OF FREEDOM 91 (1997)
("Now when you say those words 'substantive due process' over and over, you must see...
that the phrase is incorrigibly self-contradictory."); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 (1984) (referring to "the awful
oxymoron of substantive due process"); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process
After Gonzales v. Carbart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (2008) ("For me as an originalist,
the very notion of substantive due process is an oxymoron."); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 857,
897 (2009) (calling substantive due process a "made-up, atextual invention").
5. Debates over the conceptual difference between substance and process in the
context of due process of law are of long standing. For a flavor of the various positions,
see, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV.
254
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It would be valuable enough to stop there. For as central as
the Due Process Clause has been to constitutional law over the
last century, the inconsistency of Griswold v. Connecticut6 and its
progeny with the constitutional text is no longer contested.7 As
time has passed, the weight of stare decisis has crowded out any
affirmative textual argument in favor of "substantive" due
process. The Court itself said three decades ago in a unanimous
opinion that substantive due process is not suggested by the
Constitution's language and indeed "is nothing more than the
accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' This concession tends to stunt the
growth of the doctrine and places supporters of particular
constitutional rights-especially to sexual and reproductive
autonomy-unnecessarily on the defensive. It also poses a
dilemma for teachers of constitutional law, who must indoctrinate
into students a textual difference between "substantive" and
"procedural" due process that disappears on reflection.
As Part II explains, it was not always thus. Substantive due
process was a phrase seldom used in constitutional law until at
least the 1960s, and its prominence rose dramatically in the 1980s
when legal conservatives (and some liberals) began to lampoon it
as a textual anomaly. It was not, as some would have it, a careless
Warren Court innovation, repurposed from the Gilded Age and
exposed for its absurdity after the rise of textualism. In fact, from
the dawn of the Fourteenth Amendment up until the Warren
Court, invocations of due process were frequently what we would
now call "substantive" due process, and attacks on the doctrine
were not usually based on the Constitution's text, which is too
vague to contradict much of anything. The term substantive due
process was part of the rhetorical process that made Lochner v.
New York an anticanonical precedent, one that is repeatedly and
(nearly) universally cited as an example of badly misguided
85. Whether or not there is a conceptual difference, I do believe there is a practical
difference, as noted below. See Part I infra.
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. This is true of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment Clauses. As this
Essay focuses on the text rather than the history of the provisions, I use the clauses
interchangeably unless noted. For discussion of potential differences between the two
clauses, see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408 (2010).
8. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985) (quoting
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
255
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constitutional decision making.' Lochner's anticanonicity came
about in the 1970s and flourished in the 1980s as part of the case
against sexual privacy and abortion rights. Substantive due
process was a phrase largely created by its enemies and attributed
to its supporters in a strategic assault on particular Court
decisions.
Part III sorts out the implications of this story for the role of
analytic integrity in the formation of constitutional arguments.
Whether or not substantive due process is logically a
contradiction in terms, its status as an oxymoron has become what
I call a constitutional meme. A meme is a cultural element-a
word, an idea, a set of assumptions-whose growth and evolution
are sometimes said to mimic genetic transmission.10 A
constitutional meme is one passed among and through
generations of lawyers, scholars, and judges as the conventional
wisdom of constitutional law. The wrongness of Lochner, the
unamendability of the Constitution via Article V, the tiers of
scrutiny framework, and the textual absurdity of substantive due
process each exemplifies a constitutional meme. Each is an idea,
a cluster of information, so deeply embedded that it is often stated
without further proof or elaboration and resists
counterargument.1"
Constitutional memes are vital to constitutional law. We can
understand constitutional law as a set of resources for making
9. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
10. See e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 215 (1976).
11. Each of the examples noted in the text is notionally vulnerable to
counterargument. Lochner is consistent with a culture of rights, a concern for minority
political representation, and (arguably) the original understanding of the Due Process
Clause. See Greene, supra note 9, at 417-22; see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2012). The U.S. Constitution is infrequently amended in
comparison to many in the world, see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES
MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009), but it is far from
obvious whether this textual stability is structurally determined or is instead a dynamic
feature of the prevailing constitutional culture. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does
the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges
of Measuring Amendment Difficulty (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics,
Working Paper No. 682, 2014); see also JOHN 0. McGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 69-72 (2013) (arguing that the Article V
amendment process has not been too strict to prevent substantial political change). The
descriptive imprecision of the tiers of scrutiny framework is well-known, see, e.g., James E.
Fleming, "There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause": An Appreciation of Justice
Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006), even as
departures from the framework continue to form the basis for criticism of the Court's
work. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2015).
256
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constitutional arguments. Those resources fall within a limited
number of domains-the text, historical materials, precedents,
prudential arguments, and so forth. Close cases arise when
advocates for divergent positions both have substantial resources
to draw upon within these domains. Constitutional doctrine does
not depend on which set of resources provides correct answers in
some metaphysical sense; it depends on who successfully
persuades judges and other legal officials who enjoy decision-
making authority. Invoking constitutional memes can help to
persuade decision-makers by narrowing the ground of argument
in ways that are favorable to one's position.
Judges operate subject to ethical obligations extending
beyond the need to persuade decision-makers, and that may
temper their resort to memes that are rhetorically useful but false.
But the epistemological structure of constitutional law does not
permit constitutional judges to ignore altogether the demands of
persuasion. They must, in effect, translate their decisions into a
language susceptible to validation by the public that constitutional
law ultimately serves. The act of translation can place a judge in
the uncomfortable but unavoidable space between legal fictions
and lies.12
I
Substantive due process is often defined but rarely with
precision. John Hart Ely's quip that substantive due process is a
contradiction in terms- "sort of like 'green pastel redness"' -is
as famous as anything ever said in a constitutional law
monograph, but the ubiquity of the quip should raise suspicion as
to its analytic clarity.14 Ely describes his target as the view that the
12. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS 141 (C.K. Ogden ed.,
1932) ("What you have been doing by fiction-could you, or could you not, have done it
without the fiction? If not, your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a foolish one. Such is the
dilemma. Lawyer! [E]scape from it if you can.").
13. ELY, supra note 1, at 18.
14. Universal or near-universal assent is sometimes said to be a measure of truth.
See John Finnis, Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 53, 54 (1998)
(describing the Platonic viewpoint). Often this claim assumes not only some form of
rational deliberation and reflective judgment on the part of participants but it also may
assume that individuals are more likely than not to be right. See H.. .16ne Landemore,
Collective Wisdom: Old and New, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND
MECHANISMS 2 (H.. .line Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012). Cf JAMES SUROWIECKI,
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND How
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS
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Due Process Clause "incorporat[es] a general mandate to review
the substantive merits of legislative and other governmental
action."' 5 Justice Scalia, the most prominent modern critic of the
doctrine, writes:
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause] guarantees
only process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be
taken; even life can be taken; but not without the process that
our traditions require-notably, a validly enacted law and a fair
trial. To say otherwise is to abandon textualism, and to render
democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judicial
lawmaking.16
In the same vein, Robert Bork insists that the Due Process Clause
"is simply a requirement that the substance of any law be applied
to a person through fair procedures by any tribunal hearing a case
[and] says nothing whatever about what the substance of the law
must be."l7 Laurence Tribe writes that the text of the provision
"suggests a guarantee that, whatever the substance of the rules of
conduct government promulgates, those rules may not be brought
to bear on any person so as to deprive that person of life, liberty,
or property without fair procedures-such as a hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker."s Richard Posner has called substantive
due process a "durable oxymoron" whereunder "persons harmed
by state regulation [may] complain that the regulation is so
unreasonable a deprivation of life, liberty, or property that it is
unconstitutional even if adopted and applied in conformity with
the most rigorous procedural safeguards." 9
(2004)). Unanimity may reflect a lack of textured analysis or incomplete theorization. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
The Talmudic puzzle that unanimity on the Sanhedrin led to acquittal seems to adopt some
version of this reasoning-a unanimous verdict suggests a troubling lack of independent
judgment. See Emphraim Glatt, The Unanimous Verdict According to the Talmud:Ancient
Law Providing Insight Into Modern Legal Theory, 3 PACE INT'L L. REv. ONLINE 316,324-
25 (2013).
15. Ely, supra note 1 at 15.
16. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24-25 (Amy Gutmann
ed.,1997).
17. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31 (1990).
18. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed.
2000).
19. Ill. Psychological Ass'n. v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process "the
ubiquitous oxymoron").
258
2016] MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
An example may help to diagnose the inadequacy of these
formulations as criticisms of substantive due process. The Court's
recent, controversial expansion of the Due Process Clause to
condemn prohibitions on same-sex marriage supplies a ready
hypothetical. Let us turn back the clock to the day before the
Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.20 Suppose a county
registrar refuses to issue a marriage license solely on the ground
that the two people who wish to marry are both men. In this
particular state, the state constitution defines marriage as the
union of a man and a woman. The couple sues, arguing that an
agent of the state has deprived them of liberty without due process
of law in violation of the federal Constitution. According to Ely,
Scalia, Bork, Tribe, and Posner-an august, eclectic bunch-this
claim does violence to the text (a charge that would bother some
more than others).
But why? Getting married is a liberty, indeed one previously
recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court,21 and denial of
a marriage license constitutes a deprivation of that liberty. The
denial was effected by a process of law, namely a state
constitutional amendment. And the couple's claim is that this
process is not the one "due" to them in light of the significance of
the deprived interest. A more rigorous legal process-for
example, a federal constitutional ban on same-sex marriage-
would have extinguished the couple's constitutional claim. A less
rigorous but categorically distinct legal process -a determination
by a Supreme Court majority that the state had sufficient reason
to deny the license and that its denial bore a sufficient relationship
to that interest-also would have extinguished the couple's claim.
As it turns out, the state's process for effecting its deprivation of
liberty was held to be inadequate-i.e., not due-and hence the
availability of same-sex marriage is now the law of the land.
On this view, substantive due process is not, as Ely would
have it, a mandate to review the "merits" of governmental action
but is instead a mandate to determine which of a long menu of
procedural boxes fits a particular kind of state deprivation. Justice
Scalia is right that the text speaks of process, but in adding that
''process" means a "validly enacted law and a fair trial," he
20. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
21. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978). But see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2635-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Due Process Clause does not protect positive liberties).
259
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concedes that the clause requires judges to determine which laws
are validly enacted and which trials are fair. These are substantive
questions. Accordingly, Judge Bork cannot mean that the Due
Process Clause requires only that the substance of "any" law be
applied through fair procedures; he would insist, I assume, that
the clause further require, as Justice Scalia implies, that those laws
be enacted by constitutionally competent lawmakers. And who is
competent to enact a particular law must depend, in part, on what
the law does. Likewise, Professor Tribe skips a step when he takes
"the rules of conduct government promulgates" as given rather
than as the outcome of a process whose fairness must be matched
to the nature and scope of the deprived life, liberty, or property.
Finally, it is simply wrong, pace Judge Posner, to say that a
substantive due process claimant thinks no procedural safeguard
would be adequate to justify the deprivation, since a valid
constitutional amendment or a law passed in satisfaction of strict
judicial scrutiny would suffice (even if they are not the relief the
claimant seeks). Put another way, the claim is not that a
challenged deprivation may not occur regardless of the process
that attends it; it is that the deprivation may not occur in light of
the process that effected it.
Conceived in this way, it is easy to see how due process may
be conceptualized along a loose (and perhaps overlapping)
spectrum from what we tend to see as its procedural to its
substantive elements. This is so because multiple ambiguities
enable a diversity of "processes" to satisfy the textual commands
of the Due Process Clause.22 For a relatively minor deprivation,
such as the $23.50 in hobby materials allegedly lost by Nebraska
corrections officials in Parratt v. Taylor,23 due process of law might
be no more than the availability of a state tort system. For a more
serious deprivation, such as the loss of life-sustaining but
statutorily defined welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,24 a pre-
deprivation administrative hearing is "due." For marginal
deprivations of certain fundamental rights, ordinary, non-
arbitrary legislation might be enough,25 but for absolute
22. Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 90 ("The language of the [Due Process
Clauses] .... could mean just about anything.").
23. 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981).
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (Joint Op.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387
(1978).
260
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deprivations, the Constitution must be amended or the legislation
must be subject to review by an independent adjudicator-a panel
of judges -employing certain standards of necessity and fit.26
The path from procedural to substantive requirements for
legislative or judicial review is not necessarily linear in respect to
the severity of the deprivation. Bert Taylor, Jr. could likely have
raised a substantive due process objection had his $23.50 in hobby
materials been deprived intentionally rather than negligently,2 7
but John Kelly had no substantive entitlement to intentionally
deprived benefits that had kept him from homelessness.2 8 Still, the
language of "fundamental" rights as the trigger for substantive
due process suggests that strict scrutiny or constitutional
amendment are the bulwarks against deprivations that are
categorically more substantial than the ordinary liberty and
property interests that trigger procedural due process protection.
Claims that substantive due process doctrine describes an
approach to a set of rights whose deprivation is never allowed, no
matter the process, 29 apply only to absolute, non-derogable
rights.30 It is possible that such rights exist in the American
system-the right against genocide, say3 1-but the steady assault
on substantive due process does not have these kinds of jus cogens
norms in mind.
Two overlapping objections deserve elaboration. First, there
is a pleading issue. A procedural due process claim typically prays
for procedural protection to attach to the complained of
deprivation. A substantive due process claim does not typically
26. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elec. Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008); Zablocki, 434 U.S.
at 388.
27. Indeed, though Parratt was decided as a procedural due process case, Richard
Fallon has argued that because Taylor complained that the state lacked adequate reasons
for affecting the loss of his hobby materials, the underlying grievance was better
understood in substantive due process terms. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
341-44 (1993); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552-53 (Powell, J., concurring in the result)
(noting that the Court's holding that there had been a deprivation in a constitutional sense
raises the possibility that the state violated substantive due process).
28. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,477-78 (1970).
29. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
30. See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process,
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 882 (2003). Even
this is debatable, since the word "due" could arguably contemplate that for certain
deprivations, no process could justify them.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(a) & cmt. n.
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pray for a constitutional amendment or for strict judicial scrutiny
and no more. The crux of the complaint is that the deprivation
should be voided; conditional relief giving the jurisdiction the
opportunity to amend the Constitution would be not just
procedurally odd but would greatly displease the plaintiff. The
sense in which a claim is substantive rather than procedural in
nature pertains to the relief the plaintiff seeks, not the relief that
would eliminate his cause of action. The plaintiff's substantive due
process complaint directs the court's energy towards whether the
law is a proper one, which is an unmistakably substantive
question, distinguishable from questions of notice, an opportunity
to be heard, the availability of counsel, and burdens of production
and persuasion.
Any claim that substantive and procedural due process do
not involve distinct analysis would need to meet this objection,
but that is not this Part's claim. The distinction between
substantive and procedural due process is intelligible, even if
there is significant ambiguity on the margins. A due process
violation requires that the asserted life, liberty, or property
interest pass some threshold of importance and that it be deprived
without crossing some other threshold of regularity or consistency
with the way in which meaningfully similar rights are deprived.
Substantive due process claims focus on the first of these
thresholds while procedural claims focus on the second, and in
both cases it is typically assumed that the other threshold has been
crossed. Thus, these argument types are indeed distinct, and
constitutional lawyers, judges, and scholars tend to know them
when they see them. The claim of this Part is simply that the same
text-"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law" -accommodates both
argument types.
A second objection to the analysis in this Part is grounded in
the difficulty in severing textual argument from doctrine and
history. The hypothetical substantive due process claim that
opens this Part seems to track the words of the Due Process
Clause and, if successful, vindicates the couple's substantive
interest in marrying each other. But lawyers, especially those
trained in common law systems, will immediately, indeed
instinctively, see a problem with this proposed reconciliation.
Some might argue that neither a constitutional amendment nor
judicial application of strict scrutiny counts as a "process" within
262
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the meaning of the term "due process of law." The processes the
Due Process Clause contemplates are those such as notice of
adverse claims, an opportunity to be heard before a neutral
decisionmaker, with the benefit of counsel and certain evidentiary
protections, and so forth. Perhaps a handful of those lawyers will
allow that the Due Process Clause might be concerned as well
with the legislative procedures attending a challenged law, or to
the process of judicial review itself. But in that case, the kinds of
infirmities that would make these processes "undue" are not what
our hypothetical has in mind. An "undue" legislative process is
one that, say, lacks a quorum, operates under a non-majoritarian
voting rule, or includes unelected legislators. 32 An "undue"
judicial review process is one conducted by a biased or (literally)
incompetent judge.33 The notion that the process of ordinary
lawmaking is not "due" because an interest is sufficiently
fundamental to require a process of constitutional amendment, or
that the process of rational basis judicial review is not "due"
because the interest at stake requires strict scrutiny, will strike the
common lawyer as casuistic.
Whatever the virtues of this effort to recover a textual
argument against substantive due process, it does not rely on the
text, at least not in a way that Ely's joke has the resources to
describe. For illumination, consider an example borrowed from
Lon Fuller, which he in turn borrowed from John Austin.34 Austin
puzzled over the erstwhile English legal fiction, expounded by
Blackstone, that "husband and wife are one person."35 Austin
writes, "I rather impute such fictions to the sheer imbecility (or, if
you will, to the active and sportive fancies) of their grave and
venerable authors, than to any deliberate design, good or evil." 36
32. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 240 (1976).
33. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that due
process of law requires judicial recusal where significant judicial election contributions by
a litigant to a judge in his or her case create an appearance of bias); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting administrative adjudication of private rights so long as final
adjudication was available in Article III courts); Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff,
The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial
Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2014)
(arguing that judicial elections violate the Due Process Clause).
34. See L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1930).
35. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 630 (1873); see also I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769) 442-45.
36. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 631.
263
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From a narrow perspective, it would be oxymoronic to say that
husband and wife are one person, no less than to say that two is
equal to one.
But as Fuller notes, Austin's complaint was not really against
the use of language but rather against the claim being made about
the legal relation between husband and wife.37 Even from the
internal perspective of English law, husband and wife were not a
unit for all purposes: "When it is said . . . 'that husband and wife
are one person,' the meaning merely is, that they lie under certain
incapacities with respect to one another. And where those
incapacities do not intervene, the fiction of their unity ceases, and
they are deemed twain."38 Calling the phrase "imbecilic" draws
rhetorical leverage from the absurdity of the language, taken
narrowly, but Austin's disagreement with Blackstone is, in the
end, a legal dispute, and a pedantic one at that. Fuller likens
"husband and wife are one" to the statement, "A has a legal right
against B to payment of $100."39 Knowing that A has a legal right
does not, without more, tell us "whether A may forcibly take $100
from B's pocket, nor whether A may have B jailed if B refuses to
pay the $100. For the particulars, [we] must go elsewhere." 40
Likewise, to understand why substantive due process sounds
oxymoronic requires more than a knowledge of the English
language. For the particulars, we must tap into a certain, and
notably incomplete, legal tradition. Abstracted from any such
tradition at a particular point in time, "due process of law" is a
meaningless string of words.4 1 It acquires meaning as a legal term
through its use in the law. The strongest version of this point
would draw on the hermeneutic tradition and observe that all
language is culturally and temporally situated, such that no phrase
whose meaning is understood by its speakers or listeners could
possibly be a nonsensical juxtaposition of opposites. "Jumbo
shrimp" evokes RED LOBSTER@, not confusion. Indeed, we
might better define an oxymoron not as a contradiction-in-terms
but instead as a paradox, a superficial internal tension that abates
37. See Fuller, supra note 34, at 387.
38. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 630.
39. Fuller, supra note 34, at 388.
40. Id.
41. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 90.
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on reflection.42 Substantive due process is just such a paradox, and
so calling it an oxymoron reflects rather than undermines its
inherent consistency.
But we need not take a detour into the philosophy of
language to understand that "due process of law" has meant
different things to different actors at different points in the history
of American law. No less an authority than Antonin Scalia
provided a guided tour of those meanings in his concurring
opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.43 The Haslip
Court rejected a substantive due process claim by an insurance
company complaining about the size of a punitive damages award.
Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment but would have held that
any procedurally sound punitive damages award that did not
violate the Bill of Rights satisfied the Due Process Clause.44 in so
arguing, he offered a standard account of the origins of the due
process language in the U.S. Constitution.
The clause seems first to have appeared in a 1354 English
statute: "No man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be
put out of land or tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by
due process of the law."45 Despite conflicting historical evidence,46
the English jurist Sir Edward Coke thought the term was identical
to the phrase "Law of the Land" (per legem terrae) as used in
Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta:
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of
his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon
him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or
by the Law of the Land.47
42. See Marvin K.L. Ching, A Literary and Linguistic Analysis of Compact Verbal
Paradox, 26 COLLEGE COMPOSITION & COMM. 384, 384 (1975).
43. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
44. See id. at 24-25.
45. Id. at 28 (quoting Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.)).
46. See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due
Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 267 (1975) ("[Tjhe provision seems merely to
require that the appropriate writ be used to summon the accused before the court to
answer the complaints against him.").
47. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 9 Hen.
1II, ch. 29 (1225)); See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION *351-*353 (1st ed. 1868).
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The "law of the land" meant the customary adjudicative
procedures under the English common law.48
American colonists, familiar with Coke, incorporated "law of
the land" language into eighteenth century state constitutions,
and the same basic meaning-according to customary English
procedures-survived as the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.49 In Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,"o decided in 1856, the Court
affirmed Coke's translation but also noted that the provision
constrained "the legislature as well as . . . the executive and
judicial powers of the government."51
The Court's first significant elaboration of the meaning of the
clause subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
came in Hurtado v. California, an 1884 decision in which a
convicted murderer argued, unsuccessfully, that due process of
law required a grand-jury indictment.52 Justice Scalia's Haslip
concurrence takes from Hurtado that historical practice is
sufficient but not necessary to qualify as due process of law. 53 A
procedure not blessed by history would be invalid if it failed to
comport with "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."54
Justice Scalia's opinion notes that by 1934, when the Court
decided Snyder v. Massachusetts,5 consistency with the principles
of "fundamental justice" seemed to have become a necessary
condition of all procedures to satisfy the Constitution."
Although historical practice carried great and perhaps
dispositive weight according to the Snyder Court, Justice Scalia
writes that incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states
caused cleavage between historical practice and what the Bill of
Rights required.57 The Court came to the view that its own
48. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. Id. at 29.
50. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1855).
51. Id. at 276.
52. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
53. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 31-32. Justice Scalia's opinion understates the breadth of the
Hurtado Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
54. Id. at 32 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535).
55. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
56. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. See id. at 34-35.
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interpretations of the Bill of Rights, developed in the context of
exclusive application to the federal government, also set a lower
bound for what qualified as fundamental fairness. This conflation
meant that states that violated the Bill of Rights as previously
defined by the Court automatically violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Over time, and
unsurprisingly, the Court began to understand the Due Process
Clause to prohibit any practice that failed a test of "fundamental
fairness," no matter its historical pedigree and no matter its
relationship to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." In
Haslip, decided a quarter century ago, Justice Scalia's opinion
traces this analysis to "due process opinions in recent decades."a
Justice Scalia's tour of the history of the Due Process Clause
effectively makes the point that substantive due process is not a
contradiction in terms. Due process of law is meaningless in the
abstract, extracted from its historical situation. It once seems to
have meant according to "specific writs employed in the English
courts." 61 Later, it meant "according to the law of the land," a
phrase that itself seemed to refer to customary English procedure.
Later, it meant "according to traditional practice" or "according
to the tenets of fundamental justice." Later, and for at least the
past several decades, it has meant "according to principles of
fundamental fairness," a concededly substantive standard.
And there is more. At least two other definitions of due
process of law emerged during the early and middle decades of
the nineteenth century and thus can be assumed to have
influenced the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 2 On one
view, due process of law would be violated by a law that defeated
vested property rights by denying compensation after a taking or
by transferring property from one private person to another.6 3 On
another related but broader view, due process of law required that
laws be appropriately general and prospective rather than class-
58. See id. at 35.
59. See id. at 36.
60. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 28.
62. See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine ofDue Process of Law Before the Civil War,
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 375 (1911); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 498 (1997); Williams, supra note 7, at 416,423-25.
63. See Harrison, supra note 62, at 506-20.
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based, retrospective, or arbitrary.' On either view, the Due
Process Clause binds the legislature and extends beyond mere
procedural regularity. Note as well that just about everyone
agrees that the American usage of "due process of law" is
synonymous with "by the law of the land," a phrase that, though
likely a reference to procedures, does not explicitly refer to
process.65 Was per legem terrae also a contradiction in terms? Or
is it rather that the text is not literal and therefore not susceptible
to denotation as an oxymoron in any but a trivial sense? 66
Justice Scalia has exhaustively worked out a theory that tells
us which of the many definitions of due process of law is the one
judges in constitutional cases should adopt.67 But to say that the
traditional understanding of a legal term (much less one
traditional understanding among others) just is its current textual
meaning confuses a theory of language with a theory of
interpretation. 68 And so, as we might have suspected all along, the
claim that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms is
really just a volley in the eternal debates over constitutional
interpretation. Those debates are deeply contested and it really is
very helpful for one side to be able to say, credibly on the surface,
that the other side's position disobeys the rules of English.
Revealing the sparseness of the textual argument against
substantive due process unstacks the deck.
II
As noted, inconsistency with the text is hardly the sole
objection to substantive due process. One could reject substantive
due process for at least as many reasons as there are forms of
64. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) ("It is not every act,
legislative in form, that is law ... It must be not a special rule for a particular person or a
particular case, but . . . 'the general law,' . . . and thus [excludes] . . . special, partial, and
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation.").
65. Although many scholars doubt that Coke was right to equate the phrases, see,
e.g., Corwin, supra note 62, few doubt that Americans relied on Coke's views. See Charles
M. Hough, Due Process of Law- To-day, 32 HARv. L. REv. 218,218 (1919).
66. It would then not be a contradiction in terms but would be a true oxymoron-a
term whose literal sense is not interesting. See Brian Cummings, Literally Speaking, or, the
Literal Sense from Augustine to Lacan, 21 PARAGRAPH 200,218 (1998).
67. See generally SCALIA, supra note 16 (expounding textualist-originalist theories
of interpretation).
68. Cf. Fuller, supra note 34, at 377 (arguing that the claim that a word is a fiction
"must be based ultimately on the notion that the word ... has reached the legitimate end
of its evolution and that it ought to be pinned down where it now is").
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orthodox constitutional argument. One could argue that it is
inconsistent with the intentions or understandings of the framers
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; that it resurrects
repudiated precedents such as Lochner or Dred Scott; that it
requires substantive value judgments in a Constitution that prizes
judicial regulation through procedure; or that it encourages
judges to engage in policymaking at the expense of democracy.
We have heard all of these complaints before. It would be
surprising if no one before Ely thought to supplement these
arguments with the simple observation that substantive due
process is a nonsense phrase that makes hash of the text, but that
isn't far from the truth. The phrase "substantive due process" has
been in legal circulation since at least the 1920s,69 but it is
surprisingly difficult to find criticisms of either the term itself or
its underlying concept that are framed in textual terms prior to the
1980s.
In fact, I am aware of only three authors to have referred to
substantive due process as either an oxymoron or a contradiction
in terms before Ely did so in 1980.70 The earliest such reference
appears in a 1956 Canadian law review article by W.F. Bowker,
who was then the dean of the law school at the University of
Alberta.71 Bowker was comparing property rights in Canada and
the United States and noted that although the Due Process Clause
seemed to place no substantive limitations on legislation affecting
property rights, it had been interpreted otherwise. "Thus,"
Bowker wrote, "grew the concept of 'substantive due process,' a
contradiction in terms to be sure, but one that for about a half a
century ending just before World War II operated to impose
severe restrictions on economic legislation."72
The second reference comes in historian Leonard Levy's
introduction to Robert McCloskey's classic defense of economic
due process that appears in an edited volume of essays on the U.S.
69. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Judicial Decisions in Their Substantive Law
Aspect Under the Due Process Clause, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 619, 619 (1928) (defining
"substantive due process").
70. I do not doubt that there are others, but I have not found them.
71. See W.F. Bowker, Protection of Basic Rights and Liberties, 2 U. B.C. LEGAL
NOTEs 281, 311 (1956).
72. Id. at 311.
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Constitution. Levy criticizes McCloskey for failing to
acknowledge that substantive due process "was always a judicially
contrived, oxymoronic concept that distorted history, logic, and
plain meaning." 74 The certitude of Levy's skepticism here is
mysterious. Levy has in other writing conceded that a version of
substantive due process is historically available (if inconclusive),
and moreover that the Due Process Clause is "written in language
that blocks fixed meanings." 5
Finally, Hermine Herta Meyer, a Justice Department lawyer,
referred to substantive due process as "self-contradictory," "a
contradiction in terms," and "an invention of American judges"
in a 1972 law review article defending the pretrial detention
procedures of the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.76 Meyer's article appears to have
been part of a coordinated effort by members of the Nixon Justice
Department to influence how courts would treat legislative bail
reform. Meyer later called substantive due process a "nonsense
phrase" in her 1977 book on the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment published by the vanity publisher Vantage Press.78
It is perilous to draw conclusions from this small (and likely
under-inclusive) sample of pre-1980s references to the internally
contradictory character of substantive due process, but it is
difficult not to notice that none of the three was a lawyer raised in
the United States. Bowker was a Canadian lawyer, Levy a non-
lawyer born in Canada, and Meyer a German lawyer who
immigrated to the United States as an adult. This coincidence
suggests (if dimly) the possibility that a superficially available
textual argument against substantive due process was nonetheless
73. Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process
and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 157 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
74. Id.
75. LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 120 (1995).
76. Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1381,
1417 (1972).
77. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America's Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail,
55 ARIz. L. REV. 909, 958-59 (2013).
78. HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 127 (1977).
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foreign to the American legal culture.79 The canonical critique was
located outside the text.
The origin of substantive due process is sometimes traced to
Chief Justice Taney's lead opinion in Dred Scott.s This accusation
(le mot juste) is better rhetoric than it is legal history,s" but its
accuracy is not presently important. It is enough to say that the
opinion may plausibly be read as holding that a law prohibiting
slavery in federal territories violates the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause because it deprives slaveholders of vested
property rights in their slaves." The dissenters, Justice McLean
and Justice Curtis, disputed this holding on the merits but neither
of them questioned the applicability of the Due Process Clause as
a substantive limitation on legislative activity.
Likewise, in Lochner v. New York, the chief error of which
has frequently been described as its resort to substantive due
process,83 neither of the two dissenting opinions suggested that the
Due Process Clause is or should be concerned only with
adjudicative procedures.8 4 Justice Harlan explicitly endorsed
substantive due process" but found the Bakeshop Act
reasonable.86 Justice Holmes counseled legislative deference-
what we today would call rational basis review-but his opinion
79. In case it is not clear from the main text, I do not wish to overstate this point.
Bowker received his LL.M. degree from the University of Minnesota, see Bowker, supra
note 71, at 281, Levy is a Pulitzer Prize-winning American constitutional historian, see
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION (1968), and Meyer became a prominent federal government lawyer, see
Hegreness, supra note 77, at 958-59. Still, whether one's exposure to the domestic legal
culture occurs during one's formative professional years or at some other time might
plausibly affect one's instincts towards a legal term of art such as due process of law. In
particular, judicial review in Canada did not extend to constitutional rights at the time of
Bowker's writing, and the Continental civil law tradition rejects the kind of evolutionary
jurisprudence that gave birth to substantive due process.
80. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 17, at 31.
81. See James W. Ely, Jr. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315, 318 (1999).
82. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). The "substantive due process"
holding, which does not use the precise term, is notoriously opaque. See DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCorr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 382 (1978).
83. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514-16 (Black, J., dissenting).
84. See Corwin, supra note 62, at 367; John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1561-62 (2006).
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Granting, then,
that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated even under the sanction of direct
legislative enactment.
86. Id. at 69-73.
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nonetheless rests on the view that the Due Process Clause
requires judges to inquire into "fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law."8 7 Holmes betrayed no textual or other principled objection
to substantive due process: "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases." 88
There is some evidence that Louis Brandeis, the other great
dissenter of the Lochner era, believed, as a matter of principle,
that the Due Process Clause should be limited to procedural
irregularities. Felix Frankfurter noted as much in transcribing a
1923 conversation with Brandeis in which the latter is reported to
have said further that, so long as due process is recognized as
having a substantive component, it must be applied to those rights
that are truly fundamental such as speech and education."
Brandeis's contingent adoption of substantive due process reflects
his position in Meyer v. Nebraska90 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters9 -both education cases in which Brandeis joined the
majority's substantive due process holding-and in Gilbert v.
Minnesota,9 2 in which he dissented from the Court's opinion
upholding a Minnesota anti-sedition law. After recounting the
Court's series of substantive due process holdings in the economic
realm, Brandies wrote in Gilbert, "I cannot believe that the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty
to acquire and to enjoy property."93
Justice Brandeis's reluctant acceptance of substantive due
process is also of course reflected in his famous concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California.94 "Despite arguments to the
contrary which had seemed to me persuasive," he wrote, "it is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
87. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. Id. Indeed, although Holmes dissented from the Court's substantive due process
holding in Meyer v. Nebraska, see Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), he joined the unanimous opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), without any separate writing. Moreover, his dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), suggested a (perhaps grudging) commitment to substantive
protection of rights via Due Process Clause. See id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
299, 320.
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
93. Id. at 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
94. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
272
2016] MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure."95 I am not aware of any writings in which Brandeis
specified what, precisely, those persuasive arguments comprised.
This point is significant in itself. Brandeis's approach to law was
intensely fact-specific, not given to pronouncements of what legal
provisions mean in a metaphysical sense. It was appropriate to his
life as an advocate that the meaning of the Due Process Clause
could be settled through legal argumentation and precedent and
not thereafter revisited ex tabula rasa. Moreover, as his Gilbert
dissent reflects, Justice Brandeis's views on the Due Process
Clause are inseparable from his views on the property rights with
which the clause had always been associated in its substantive
form.
His disciple Frankfurter likewise agreed with Brandeis about
the procedural connotations of substantive due process" but
likewise seemed motivated less by any philosophical objection
than by distaste for the results he observed. Like Brandeis,
Frankfurter supported the Court's decisions in Meyer and Pierce,
but he thought that liberty-protecting decisions such as those
could not justify the cost of property-protecting decisions like
Lochner and Coppage v. Kansas.97 As a judge, Frankfurter gave
no hint of dissent from the proposition that the Due Process
Clause forbids certain significant rights deprivations.98 He joined
several opinions in which the Court overturned (or the joined
dissent would have overturned) non-procedural state laws as
violations of due process;99 concurring in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, overturning a state-level subversive activities
prosecution, Justice Frankfurter wrote that striking a balance
between a citizen's right to political privacy and the State's right
to self-protection "is the inescapable judicial task in giving
substantive content, legally enforced, to the Due Process
95. Id. at 373.
96. Urofsky, supra note 89, at 320; Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform,
40 NEW REPUBLIC 110, 113 (1924) ("The due process clauses ought to go.").
97. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating legislation that forbid yellow-
dog contracts); see Felix Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?,
unsigned editorial, 43 NEW REPUBLIC 85, 86 (1925), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS:
OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 195, 196 (1st ed., 1939).
98. See Louis H. Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 67 YALE L.J. 304, 317 (1957).
99. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Clause."" To be sure, Frankfurter, like Holmes, believed deeply
in legislative deference.'o But that did not mean the Court should
stay altogether out of the business of ensuring that, as Justice
Jackson wrote, joined by Frankfurter, "reasonable general
legislation [is] reasonably applied to the individual." 1 02
To recap, none of the great opponents of substantive due
process prior to the 1960s opposed it on textual grounds. As
discussed below, that omission results in part from an intellectual
temperament within the constitutional culture that was less
literalist and, relatedly, less worshipful of the constitutional text
and its authors. 0 3
Discussion of substantive due process among constitutional
lawyers and commentators grew dramatically in the 1960s and
1970s. Figure 1 reproduces an Ngram of references to
"substantive due process" in English-language books digitally
catalogued by Google Books from 1920 to 2008.104 The Ngram
illustrates a sharp upward trend with an inflection point at 1965,
the year in which the Supreme Court decided Griswold v.
Connecticut 05 and four years after the Court decided Griswold's
predecessor case, Poe v. Ullman.106 Griswold, which overturned a
Connecticut ban on contraceptive use, drew plenty of fire,
including from the dissenting opinions of Justice Black and Justice
Stewart. But neither opinion argues that the Due Process Clause
applies only to "process." Justice Black opposed Griswold and
other substantive due process holdings on the ground that they
protected rights that were not explicit in the constitutional text
and therefore granted an inappropriate amount of discretion to
100. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result).
101. See Pollak, supra note 98.
102. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953).
103. See Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103
CALIF. L. REv. 335 (2015).
104. Google books Ngram Viewer, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?
content=substantive+due+process&year-start=1920&year-end=2008&corpus=15&
smoothing=3&share=&direct url=tl%3B%2Csubstantive%20due%20process%3B%
2CcO (search run Aug. 9, 2015). The table has a smoothing of 3, which means that each
year represents an average of that year's value and the values of the three years before and
after. Also, the values are reported as a percentage of the complete catalog for any given
year, which makes it unlikely that the trend is driven by changes in the denominator rather
than the numerator. It is difficult to say this with certainty, however, since we do not know
how the proportion of books in the dataset relating to constitutional law varies over time.
105. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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judges.107 Justice Stewart joined Justice Black's opinion and
opposed the decision on similar democratic process grounds. os
The structure of Justice Douglas's majority opinion likely
influenced the locus of criticism. Justice Douglas did not follow
Lochner in arguing that the Due Process Clause, of its own force,
authorizes judges to inquire into the substantive reasonableness
of state laws. Rather, he argued that the Connecticut anti-
contraceptive law touched on interests implicated in
aconstitutional right to privacy that, as a positive matter, could be
located within the interstices of the text of the Bill of Rights.'0 9
This approach proved an easy target. Representing the right to
privacy as a "penumbra" or "emanation" from the Constitution
seemed a reach to many, one that exposed a deficit in serious
arguments in favor of such rights. Grounding the interests
Douglas sought to protect more directly in the Due Process
Clause-as the opinions of Justice Goldberg,"o Justice Harlan,111
107. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510-21 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's belief in
total incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting), would have made it incongruous for him to criticize Griswold as an unduly
substantive use of the Due Process Clause.
108. See 381 U.S. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 481-84.
110. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
111. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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and Justice White11 2 all'sought to do in different ways-was more
open to criticism based on Lochnerism but was, by comparison, a
more textualist approach.
Consistent with that observation, the dominant criticisms of
substantive due process in the decade following Griswold tended
to be prudential rather than textual. Thus, Alexander Bickel and
Philip Kurland rejected a constitutional right to privacy or
otherwise objected to Griswold or Roe on the merits."' Both
believed in incorporation via the Due Process Clause. Neither
appeared to view the text as compelling a procedural focus.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe also did not object to
substantive due process tout court.'14 Indeed, he argued that an
abortion restriction without an exception for procedures thought
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life would violate the
Due Process Clause."' Even Robert Bork lodged no textual
objection to the word "process." Bork believed that any
constitutional rights not specifically enumerated in the text
requires judges to make impermissible value judgments, and so
substantive due process was an invitation to activism rather than
(necessarily) a perversion of the text.1 6 Indeed, Bork would
sacrifice the text to judicial restraint.
Textual arguments against the Due Process Clause gained
currency in the 1980s, following Ely's book. Since then, literally
hundreds of authors, including several judges in the course of
opinions, have called substantive due process oxymoronic or
contradictory, and a fair number have cited Ely for that
proposition."' Notably, the first state or federal judge to have
112. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
113. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (1977);
PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 161
(1973).
114. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White,
who also dissented in Roe, was not opposed to substantive due process. See Griswold, 381
U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173.
116. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971). Bork accepted incorporation via the Due Process Clause.
117. Court decisions include, among others: United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856,
866 n.10 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boggs); McKinney v. Pate, 985 F.2d 1502, 1509 (11th Cir. 1993)
(Fay), opinion vacated, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir. 1993); Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932
F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook); Braley v. Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 228 (6th
Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J., concurring); Blaska v. Fuentes, 836 F.2d 1347, at *13 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Nelson); Brower v. Cty of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 544 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (Goodwin); United
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called substantive due process an oxymoron in a published
opinion appears to have been Posner, who did so in a 1982 case in
which (apparently without irony) he called the doctrine
simultaneously "exotic" and "ubiquitous.""'s Judge Posner has
referred to the phrase as oxymoronic several times since.11 9
This trend surely says less about substantive due process,
which meant about the same (if not less, substantively) in the
1980s as it did before, than it says about prevailing practices of
constitutional argumentation. The more or less sudden realization
that "substantive" contradicts "process" in the Due Process
Clause-and that this is a fatal defect-coincides with the rise of
a certain kind of originalism. That rise was not organic but rather
was deliberately orchestrated by conservative activists both inside
and outside of the Reagan Justice Department.12 0 Indeed, a
substantial number of the judicial opinions to have made textual
criticisms of substantive due process-and the great majority of
the appellate opinions-were written by appointees of that
department. 12 1 Two of those appellate judges, Danny Boggs of the
Sixth Circuit and Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit,
worked under Bork in the Office of the Solicitor General in the
1970s.
Originalism does not, per se, support the view that
substantive due process is contradictory. As noted, whether the
framers of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments meant to endow
States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1568 (8th Cir. 1983) (Arnold); Ellis v. Hamilton,
669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner); Tobias v. Pletzke, 933 F. Supp. 2d 892, 917 n.18
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (Ludington); Wolverine Fireworks Display v. Towne, No. 12-10426,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79229, *42 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (Ludington); Estep v. City of
Somerset, No. 10-826-ART, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135189, *16 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (Thapar);
Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (Ferguson, Jr., J.); Swales
v. Twp. of Ravenna, 989 F. Supp. 925, 934 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (Bell); Jones v. Doria, 767
F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 550 (Ala. 2001)
(Moore, C.J., concurring specially).
118. Ellis, 669 F.2d at 512.
119. See Torregrossa v. Bd. of Trs, No. 98-374, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7383 (7th Cir.
1999) (per curiam); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989); Il. Psychological
Ass'n. v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645,
652 (7th Cir. 1985); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, 1058 (7th Cir. 1985).
120. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 154-
55, 158-59 (2004); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009); Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
121. Those appointees include Boggs, Frank Easterbrook, David Nelson, Posner, and
Scalia. Bork was also of course a D.C. Circuit appointee of President Reagan.
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the Due Process Clause with substantive content is a contested
question, and the phrase "due process of law" has long been
thought synonymous with "according to the law of the land,"
which is not inherently procedural. The 1980s turn against the
words instead reflects a particularly literal, acontextual, and
politically opportunistic (if sincere) approach to historical
argument: in the spirit of oxymorons, call it anachronistic
originalism.
Words in legal documents are not just their counterparts in
ordinary speech. They are meant to be understood by their
handlers-lawyers, usually-who operate under certain
professional assumptions that may diverge from common speech
conventions. This is not to say that legal documents, and
especially constitutions, are not meant to be understood by non-
lawyers; it is to say, rather, that even constitutions are not meant
to be misunderstood by lawyers. It is telling that Justice Black,
perhaps the most committed textualist in the Court's history, did
not believe the text of the Due Process Clause had a facially
obvious meaning: "Some might think that the words themselves
are vague," he wrote in his dissenting opinion in In re Winship,122
"[b]ut any possible ambiguity disappears when the phrase is
viewed in the light of history and the accepted meaning of those
words prior to and at the time our Constitution was written. "123
The belief that "substantive" and "process" are necessarily,
indeed risibly, in conflict transposes a modern, common-sense
view of the meaning of English words onto words in eighteenth
and nineteenth-century legal documents.
For a non-originalist and a pragmatist like Posner,124 there is
nothing untoward about this move. He does not, after all, reject
substantive due process; he just thinks it sounds silly, and he's
right. For others, conflating the common sense meaning of today
with the legal meaning of yesterday can go some way towards
affecting the legal meaning of today. "It is not that 'substantive'
due process is linguistically self-contradictory," Henry Monaghan
wrote in 1981. "It is not any longer, if one accepts the teachings of
122. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
123. Id. at 378 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black is referring to the words of the
Fifth Amendment, though the case concerned the words of the Fourteenth. The casual
conflation of these clauses is perplexing for a textualist-originalist. See Jamal Greene,
Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978 (2012).
124. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
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ordinary language philosophy that 'meaning is use.' The core
problem is one of constitutional theory, not of language." 25 But
adopting and promoting a constitutional theory that relies on
language means that changing language meaning-as through
"use"-serves one's theory. Through sufficient repetition within
the appropriate language community, the view that substantive
due process is an oxymoron can become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
If it was not an oxymoron in 1981, it is now-or so that was the
goal.
But there is more to it than this. Although the phrase
substantive due process has been around for nearly a century, the
category of claims it describes was more often simply called "due
process" for much of that time. As substantive due process
became more frequently invoked as a distinct constitutional
claim, procedural due process-which seems redundant-also
was invoked more often. Using two different words for
something-making it some things-has cognitive in addition to
linguistic consequences. Experiments in linguistics have
demonstrated that the categories that exist within a particular
language community influence participants' perception of
phenomena in the world. For example, native Spanish speakers
tend strongly to associate objects with the genders grammatically
assigned to them within the Spanish language, even if those
assignments are arbitrary.126 Thus, consistent with patterns across
languages, a native English speaker is likely to code natural
objects as feminine and artificial objects as masculine; for Spanish
speakers, this tendency is often overridden by the grammatical
categories of Spanish.127
A soft form of linguistic relativity seems likely to influence
judgments made within the language community of constitutional
lawyers. Substantive due process peels away from procedural due
process not just because of any underlying conceptual or semantic
difference but also because they carry different labels. And as
between these labels, procedural due process surely seems more
"about" "process," and therefore to have more conceptual
125. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 373-
74 (1981).
126. See Maria D. Sera, et al., Grammatical and Conceptual Forces in the Attribution
of Gender by English and Spanish Speakers, 9 COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 261 (1994).
127. See id.
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integrity. Thus, the phrase "substantive due process" helps to
generate the very textual anomaly that it is said to describe.
III
Substantive due process may not be a contradiction in terms,
but it sounds like one. Comparing it to green pastel redness is
funny, if a bit esoteric. Three of the most significant American
legal figures of the last half century, representing wildly different
jurisprudential and political ideologies-Ely, Posner, and
Scalia-have called substantive due process an oxymoron in
prominent writings. Is that enough to make it one? Should it be
enough?
A comparative example helps to sharpen the question.
Discussions of linguistic relativity migrated into the culture long
ago in the form of the old saw that there are x number of
"Eskimo" words for snow. The observation is meant to show that
language and perception are deeply interrelated. Linguist Laura
Martin has described the observation itself, however, as a kind of
folklore.'28 It seems first to have originated in a 1911 article by the
anthropologist Franz Boas, who mentioned four different Eskimo
words for "snow" in an article about the difficulty in comparing
language structures.12 9 Benjamin Whorf, a linguist, later
popularized the example, mentioning five words for "snow,"
though without naming any specific sources or data.' Two
important 1950s anthropological textbooks whose authors were
influenced by Whorf mention the example. Martin says that one
or both of those books "were probably read by most
anthropologists trained between 1960 and 1970, and by countless
other students as well during that heyday of anthropology's
popularity."13 ' By 1986, Martin was able to say that "[t]extbook
references to the example have reached such proliferation that no
complete inventory seems possible,"'32 and that the example had
128. See Laura Martin, "Eskimo Words for Snow": A Case Study in the Genesis and
Decay of an Anthropological Example, 88 AMER. ANTHROP. 418 (1986).
129. Id. at 418 (citing Franz Boas, Introduction, THE HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS 40 (1911)).
130. Id. (citing Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REv. 229-31,
247-48 (1940)).
131. Id. (citing EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 107-08, 110 (1959), and
ROGER BROWN, WORDS AND THINGS (1958)).
132. Id. at 420.
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deeply infiltrated pop culture: it appeared in a Lanford Wilson
play,133 a trivia encyclopedia,134 a New York Times editorial,13 5 and
on a local weather forecast. By the time it reached this last source,
Boas's four words had become "two hundred."136
The "Eskimo words for snow" tale is a meme, "an idea that
becomes commonly shared through social transmission."13 7 There
is disagreement within the memetics literature as to what more
one can say about memes and the degree to which they possess
the properties of evolving organisms or map onto existing social
scientific understandings of diffusion of practices, beliefs, and
other cultural artifacts.138 A technical definition is unnecessary to
the basic, suggestive insight. The motivating ideas behind memes
are that they are social-reproduction through human networks
is an existential condition-and that they tend to replicate
through imitation or absorption rather than through reflection.'9
The jurisprudentially inclined will recognize this feature of meme
transmission as "content-independence," a quality that also
attaches to the authority of common law judicial precedents.140
Memes are ubiquitous in American constitutional law.
Indeed, the common law system encourages the transmission of
legal information through shared understandings replicated by
processes of imitation that risk mutating the original source.141
133. Id. (citing The Fifth of July (1978)).
134. Id. (citing THE STRAIGHT DOPE: A COMPENDIUM OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
(1984)).
135. Id. (referring to Editorial, There's Snow Synonym, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1984).
136. Id. at 420.
137. Robert Aunger, Introduction, in DARWINIZING CULTURE 2 (Robern Aunger
ed., 2000).
138. Compare DAWKINS, supra note 10, at 206 (describing memes in terms of mental
activity), with William L. Benzon, Culture as an Evolutionary Arena, 19 J. Soc. &
EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS 321, 323 (1996) (describing memes in strictly phenotypical
terms).
139. See DAWKINS, supra note 10, at 206; SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE
(1994); see also Henry Plotkin, Culture and Psychological Mechanisms, in DARWINIZING
CULTURE, supra note 137, at 69, 78-79 (distinguishing "surface-level" and "deep-level"
memes based on the complexity of the acquired and transmitted knowledge); cf. J.M.
BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1998) ("Memes
encompass all the forms of cultural know-how that can be passed to others through the
various forms of imitation and communication.").
140. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 62 (2009); H.L.A. Hart,
Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE
AND POLITICAL THEORY 243, 261 (1982).
141. See Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: A Memetic Perspective,
39 JURIMETRICS 291, 292, 303-04 (1999).
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That imitation may be simple, as in a typical string cite, or it may
be complex, as in the practice of referring to anticanonical cases
to express methodological or substantive disagreement with an
interlocutor. For example, citations to Lochner or to Dred Scott
are not precedent-based in the usual sense but are better
characterized as forms of ethical argument.142 Ethical argument
draws upon the American self-conception as a source of
interpretive authority. 143 Invocation of anticanonical cases is
intended as a conversation-stopper, and the capacity of these
cases to serve this function endows them with value beyond
whatever underlying analogical power they may contribute.
Much of what goes under the heading of blackletter
constitutional law also has a memetic character. Owing to its
complex relationship to politics and the magnitude of the (often
capricious) Supreme Court's role within it, constitutional law has
a contingent character that resists hornbook formulations. For
example, it is common teaching that legislative abridgements of
fundamental rights are reviewed under strict scrutiny, and yet it is
remarkably difficult to find cases in which the Court has applied
that standard. This is because, consistent with the thrust of this
Essay, the Court in practice grades the reviewing standard by the
gravity of the abridgement even as it rarely acknowledges a
general practice of doing so.'" Karl Llewelyn long ago recognized
interpretive canons as having a similarly memetic structure: "to
make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the canon must
be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon."14 5
Canons are rhetorical resources, and Llewelyn's memorable
observation that each canon-based claim confronts an equally
canonical counterclaim means to demonstrate, whimsically, that
their proliferation is content-independent. 146
Richard Primus has identified a related phenomenon as a
"continuity tender," which he defines as "an inherited ritual
formula that one repeats to affirm a connection to one's
predecessors, not to endorse the content of that statement as
142. See Greene, supra note 9, at 463.
143. See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94 (1982).
144. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
145. Karl N. Liewelyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
146. See id. at 401-06.
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one's predecessors originally understood it."'47 For Primus, a
continuity tender is a kind of rote incantation that serves a
symbolic link to the past, on the order of Royal Assent to statutes
passed by the British parliament.148 "Be it enacted by the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty . . . ." serves the same community-
building purpose that other rituals serve, but it has no practical
significance.149 Primus's motivating U.S. constitutional example is
the notion that the federal government is a government of
enumerated powers. Courts recite this principle in constitutional
cases in order to emphasize a core ethical commitment of
American constitutionalism,' but in practice Congress has come
to have a general police power.s'
All continuity tenders are memes but not all memes are
continuity tenders. Repetition of a constitutional meme need not
serve the purpose of symbolic continuity with the past. It might
alternatively serve as a kind of cognitive shortcut, or heuristic.'52
Constitutional decision-making can be difficult. The resources for
resolving such cases-typically identified as text, history,
structure, precedent, and consequences-can be mutually
inconsistent, and there is no consensus on how (or whether) to
assign weights among them.'53 Cognitive heuristics can place the
interpreter into a frame of mind that streamlines decision-making,
and particular memes can be vehicles for these heuristics.
Consider two heuristics that are pervasive within legal
argument: the affect and expertise heuristics. The affect heuristic
involves reliance on whether a potential risk is emotionally coded
147. Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters 8 (March 25, 2015), MICH. L. REV.,
forthcoming 2016, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2471924.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 8-9.
150. See BOBBIT, supra note 143 at 20 (1991).
151. See Primus, supra note 147, at 14.
152. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); see also BALKIN, supra note 139, at 58-59 (describing
the role of certain memes that act as "cognitive filters"); cf. Frederic M. Bloom,
Information Lost and Found, 100 CAL. L. REV. 635, 676 (2012) ("[Ijnformation seekers
expend as little effort as they can. Given a choice between low-value-but-casily-accessible
information and high-value-but-harder-to-find substitutes, people pick low value time and
again.").
153. See BOBBrF, supra note 143 at 122-25 (1993); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). But see Richard H.
Falon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Argumentation, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1187 (1987).
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as "good" or "bad." 15 4 This heuristic is critical to System 1, or
experiential, thinking, which "encodes reality in images,
metaphors, and narratives to which affective feelings have
become attached."1 5' The expertise heuristic involves reliance on
expert validation as a quick-and-ready measure of the accuracy of
a particular judgment.1 56 Legal arguments, including those offered
by constitutional judges, make frequent use both of appeals to
emotion (including through humor) and of appeals to authority."5
Appeals of those sorts align constitutional argument with other
modes of practical discourse, as they correspond, respectively,
with the pathetic and ethical modes of persuasion first identified
by Aristotle.'
The association of the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron
meme with a joke by Ely, and subsequently with the views of other
leading figures in constitutional law, enables legal audiences-
including judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers-to process its
underlying content using heuristics. This is not to say that the
presence of the meme disables systematic processing-both
systematic and heuristic processing can occur in relation to the
same proposition-nor is it to say that commentators must be
wrong that substantive due process is an oxymoron. One could
disagree with the analysis in Part I and it would still be the case
that the ways in which the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron
meme is typically communicated make its truth or falsity less
relevant to its capacity to persuade. As Michael Fried writes,
"Memes, like genes, will succeed if they are good replicators,
whether or not they are correct or good for their human
carriers."159
There is reason, though, for constitutional lawyers to be less
bothered by this possibility than linguists are bothered by
154. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 322, 322 (2006).
155. Id. at 323; see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011)
(describing the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking); Shelly Chaiken et
al., Heuristic and Systematic Processing Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context, in
UNINTENDED THOUGHT 212, 212-213 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989)
(contrasting "heuristic" versus "systematic" processing).
156. See Chaiken et al., supra note 155, at 216.
157. See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1389 (2013).
158. See id.; ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE (GEORGE
A. KENNEDY TRANS., OXFORD UNIV. PRESS 1991).
159. Fried, supra note 141, at 298.
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apocryphal claims about Eskimo words. Martin's article on the
words-for-snow meme provoked a vigorous scholarly debate over
the accuracy of the underlying proposition." Whether the
different descriptors for snow in various dialects of Eskimo and
Inuit languages are really compound words atop a small and
uninteresting set of roots or whether the dozens of words for snow
and snow-related phenomena are each lexically distinct and
worthy of study is of great importance to linguists and
anthropologists who focus on indigenous languages.1 6' Notably for
our purposes, the fact that local weathermen appear to believe
that there are 200 Eskimo words for snow (within a given dialect,
the laugh line assumes) is of no moment to the serious debate
among language professionals. They are simply different
discourses, between which any influence, such as it may be, is
unidirectional, from the Benjamin Whorfs of the world down to
the Brick Tamlands.
Constitutional law obeys a different epistemology. It is
primarily the product of a "constitutional culture" of non-judicial
actors whose values and beliefs it incorporates. 16 2 This
observation is nearly axiomatic among political scientists, and it is
broadly shared by constitutional lawyers as well. 163 Constitutional
law takes its cues from-sits in dialogue with-legal
understandings embedded within the broader culture, and relies
on that culture for validation. Standard accounts of court
decision-making understand certain prudential mechanisms from
the perspective of the need for the. law, as Neil Siegel writes, to
"account for the conditions of its own legitimation."'" As Robert
160. See Igor Krupnik & Ludger Millier-Wille, Franz Boas and Inuktitut Terminology
for Ice and Snow: From the Emergence of the Field to the "Great Eskimo Vocabulary
Hoax", in SIKU: KNOWING OUR ICE 377, 390-91 (2010).
161. See id.
162. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4, 10 (2003).
163. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE
CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002) (defending a vision of "constitutional
law as a servant of American political life rather than its master"). Those who deny the
dynamic and culturally dependent nature of constitutional law are often the ones most
likely to describe substantive due process as an oxymoron, thereby demonstrating, again,
that modern forms of originalism are sustained by epistemological resources that only
living constitutionalism can supply. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J.
657 (2009); Post & Siegel, supra note 120.
164. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963
(2008); see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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Post notes, "the Court must find a way to articulate constitutional
law that the nation can accept as its own." 16 5
The upshot of this perspective is that, in constitutional law,
persuasion carries independent normative weight. The value of
persuasion in constitutional law is not merely instrumental or
practical, as it is in other domains, but is also semantic.
Constitutional law that fails to evolve with and seek affirmation
from the people it governs not only fails descriptively, when it
comes to the U.S. Constitution, but is also tyrannical.1" And so it
counts against a constitutional proposition that the proposition is
not persuasive.1 67 To the extent there is tension between what is
persuasive and what is "correct," it may not always be
normatively appropriate for a constitutional decision-maker to be
guided by the latter. Validation from the constitutional
community is a lot (if not all) of what matters to the legitimacy of
constitutional law. That validation happens iteratively, as judicial
actors seek both to "reflect and regulate constitutional culture," 168
but its indefinite absence is the death of a constitutional claim.
Which returns us to the question with which this Part began:
how much should we be bothered that actors throughout the
constitutional culture believe that substantive due process is an
oxymoron if the belief lacks logical foundation? The answer to
this question depends on who the actors are. Academics should of
course interrogate the conventional wisdom of their subjects, and
so constitutional law scholars and teachers should either adopt or
explicitly reject a critique along the lines of Part I. Most legal
advocates arguing either in favor of or against a substantive due
process claim should assume whatever posture is most helpful to
their overall legal position. The underlying analytic integrity of
that position is not independently relevant, though certain repeat
players such as the Solicitor General may moderate their
165. Post, supra note 162, at 11.
166. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 217 (1990) (referring to a
good judge's recognition that "their authority must be created rhetorically, in the opinion
itself; that it depends upon the informed understanding of the reader and upon his
acquiescence, not in the 'result' or even the 'reasoning' by which the result is reached, but
in the set of relations and activities created in the opinion").
167. See Greene, supra note 157, at 1454; see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE 394 (2009) ("[I]f others cannot, with the best of efforts, see that a judgment is, in
some understandable and reasonable sense, just, then not only is its implementability
adversely affected, but even its soundness would be deeply problematic.").
168. Post, supra note 162, at 10.
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advocacy in the immediate case for reputational or institutional
reasons. Although the role morality of lawyers is not without
complexity,1 69 it is clear that legal advocates need not subjectively
believe in the arguments they advance on clients' behalf.1 7 0
The more difficult question is whether different obligations
attach to judges or other constitutional decision-makers. The
possibility that memes distort the analytic integrity of
constitutional law surfaces at least two potential problems for
adjudicators, whom we will call judges for expository purposes.
First, judges might be persuaded to make decisions that they
would not make had they the time and inclination to interrogate
the meme. Second, judges might themselves make use of memes
to persuade their audiences to adopt the judges' ultimate
conclusions.
The first problem implicates the integrity of constitutional
decision-making and the second the integrity of constitutional
acceptance. Using a constitutional meme to persuade a judge as
to a legal proposition is good lawyering. It is not clear why we
should think about its effects differently than using any other
rhetorical tools to persuade a judge as to the wisdom of one's
underlying case. The risk that a judge is duped by clever lawyers
is one the American adversarial model is committed to
tolerating.' 7'
The second problem is less familiar. Could a Supreme Court
Justice agree with every jot and tittle of Part I of this Essay and
still take as given and write constitutional opinions under the
assumption that substantive due process is a contradiction in
terms?
On one hand, judges act analogously all the time. Primus's
continuity tenders demonstrate that judicial decision-makers
often write things in opinions that they know not to be correct in
a narrow sense. Charles Black memorably defended Justice
Black's insistence on First Amendment absolutism on the ground
(never publicly espoused by the Justice)1 72 that this is the right
"attitude" to take towards the Bill of Rights even as one fully
169. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
170. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008).
171. See generally JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-102 (1949).
172. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 180-81
(1981) (suggesting that Justice Black acknowledged his dissembling obliquely in private).
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appreciates the logical necessity of balancing.17 3 Bickel, of course,
was the most famous proponent of the Court's disingenuous
invocation of procedural barriers to substantive review-in the
name of principle, no less! 174 Constitutional adjudicators must
respect other values in addition to and potentially in tension with
the analytic integrity of particular propositions of constitutional
law. Common law constitutionalism indeed presupposes that
constitutional truth is constructed out of materials whose value
flows from features, such as antiquity or reliance,175 that are
orthogonal to their "correctness." One of those features is and
should be the power to persuade.
On the other hand, that concession seems to condone judicial
dishonesty. Normally lying is a moral bad,176 and it would be
surprising if judges were held to lower standards than others in
this domain. Indeed, in his blunt assessment of lawyering work as
essentially involving lying and cheating, Daniel Markovits holds
out the judicial function as commendably distinct.' David
Shapiro has urged that judicial candor is inherent in the
obligation, crucial to the legitimacy of judging, to give reasons: "In
a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse
of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions,
statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to
believe one thing about them and to say another."" Micah
Schwartzman writes that an adjudicator who brings the violence
of the state to bear upon a real-world dispute owes a moral duty
to the litigants to give an honest assessment of his or her reasons
for action. 179
Scholars who defend judicial dishonesty sometimes argue
that the rule of law requires decisions reached on policy or
intuitive grounds nonetheless to be articulated through legal
173. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63, 66.
174. See BICKEL, supra note 164, at 69; Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
175. See LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 13 (1940).
176. See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LIFE (1978).
177. MARKOVITS, supra note 170, at 3-4,14-15.
178. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737
(1987).
179. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 990 (2008).
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technicalities.!so The apparent reliance on technicalities gives a
judicial opinion the appearance of law and can conceal political
motivations. But at other times such references can have a nearly
opposite effect, suggesting a lack of judicial empathy or an
inability to appreciate the stakes of a decision. The occasional
imperative for the Supreme Court especially to communicate in
non-technical language might be one of the legacies of Brown v.
Board of Education."' Brown's outsized significance surely
results in part from an appeal to constitutional common sense,
validated over time, as a strategy for defeating legalistic but
myopic arguments based on text, history, and precedent.1 82
Any tension between the technical accuracy of a
constitutional opinion and its public intelligibility undermines the
case that judicial candor advances public understanding. The
degree of identity between judicial and public understanding is an
empirical question, and it seems obvious that perfect identity is
not the answer. That fact, if true, is not quite fatal for someone
like Schwartzman, who adopts a deontological stance towards the
obligation of judicial sincerity.'83 Note, though, that constitutional
law at the Supreme Court level is self-consciously not
deontological in respect to the litigants. The Court's standards for
certiorari disclaim any interest in "error-correction," instead
searching for cases that may be used as "vehicles" to announce
broader rules, standards, and principles for the benefit of society
more generally.184 The Court, in other words, understands its job
to treat litigants as means rather than as ends in themselves.' 5
180. See Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 155 (1994);
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
181. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
182. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 421 (1960) ("Simplicity is out of fashion, and the basic scheme of reasoning on
which these cases can be justified is awkwardly simple."); see generally JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATION
TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND
(1992).
183. See Schwartzman, supra note 179, at 990.
184. See SUP. CT. REV. 10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law."); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 234 (1991) ("Another commonly agreed upon criterion
that renders a case uncertworthy is if it is a 'bad vehicle' or has 'bad facts."').
185. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41
(Mary Gregor trans., 1997) (1785). Something of the Court's distinctive role in announcing
broader societal commitments lies behind Guido Calabresi's view that "[t]he Supreme
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I want to suggest that judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases
should best be understood as emerging from an act of translation.
Producing a judicial opinion involves multiple decision nodes. A
judge reaches a legal conclusion through some mental process, the
particulars of which are (it is important to say) irrelevant for our
purposes. Communicating that decision to an audience of
colleagues, litigants, lawyers, and the public involves a new set of
choices. If the decision was reached by intuition (and in the
unlikely event the judge is aware that it was),"" the judge must
decide whether to reveal that fact or instead to write an opinion
that uses the tools of law to validate the hunch. If the judge
reached the decision through the very application of such tools
(that is, if the judge perceives herself to have done so), the judge
still must decide whether and how to use those tools in writing the
opinion. Persuasion makes powerful demands at this stage, and a
conscientious judge should be aware that what persuades him or
her might not persuade others. The judge must communicate his
or her ideas in a distinctive register-the language, if you will, of
constitutional rhetoric.
Interpretive discourse has seen translation metaphors before,
and it is important to distinguish other uses."8 ' Lawrence Lessig
has argued that fidelity to the Constitution requires a form of
translation, a sensitivity both to an unchanging text and a
changing context that can legitimate interpretive outcomes that
differ from what originalism might superficially seem to require."
Lessig's insight is to more fully appreciate time as a dimension of
difference in textual meaning. Lessig's claim is consistent with the
notion that constitutional language such as "due process of law"
lacks the stability to make much sense of treating substantive due
process as an inherent contradiction in terms. But like most
constitutional theorists who have referenced translation, Lessig is
concerned with the meanings a decision-maker attaches to a text
he or she is charged with interpreting. My concern, instead, is with
Court must occasionally lie; the courts by and large should not." CALABRESI, supra note
172, at 179.
186. See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (examining our
inability to discern the reasons behind our thoughts and actions).
187. For a fairly comprehensive bibliography, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993).
188. See id.
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the way in which the decision-maker communicates that
interpretive decision to his or her audience.
James Boyd White's usage is closer to mine, though his
project has a different normative center. For White, the metaphor
of translation captures the idea that someone who writes a legal
opinion performs a creative act that does not (because it cannot)
simply reproduce the original text but rather is faithful both to it
and to the reader of the translation; it is "a way of establishing
relations by reciprocal gesture.""s' A translation "will be judged
by its coherence, by the kinds of fidelity it establishes with the
original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning it performs as a
gesture of its own."" Like a good translation, the lawgiver should
be humble about his or her capacity for complete exposition and
should understand the ways in which the reader's understandings
bind the law's public expression (and therefore the law itself).' 9 '
A constitutional meme is a conventional form of public
expression of constitutional law. It is not a legal fiction because its
falsity is not generally acknowledged or even realized, either by
author or by reader." But the metaphor of translation helps us to
understand why a constitutional meme is not, then, a lie -even if
its falsity is known by the author alone.'93 As an undergraduate I
took a course whose professor was a native French speaker. This
professor had a habit of referring to a prospective meeting with a
student as a rendezvous. Among French speakers, this usage is
entirely unremarkable, as the word is best translated into English
as "meeting."194 Among American students, it was embarrassingly
off-key, since in American culture the word commonly connotes
a meeting for the specific purpose of a liaison. When this
alternative meaning was (gingerly) brought to the professor's
attention, he began to say "meeting," even though rendezvous
came more naturally to his mind. We would never say the
189. WHITE, supra note 166, at 256.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 258.
192. See Fuller, supra note 34, at 368 ("A fiction is generally distinguished from an
erroneous conclusion ... by the fact that it is adopted by its author with knowledge of its
falsity.").
193. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 178, at 733 (suggesting overstatement in the claim that
"everyone understands a certain amount of dissembling to be part of the adjudication
game").
194. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1046 (2d coll. ed. 1991) (defining
"rendezvous" as "[a] prearranged meeting").
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professor was lying or even that he was being less than candid,
even though he was not speaking his mind and even though the
word he initially used "technically" meant exactly what he
intended to convey. We would say instead that he was translating.
Now consider a judge who disagrees with the Court's
decision in Obergefell. It does not matter for our purposes what
grounds this disagreement, whether a view that there is not
sufficient consensus for the Court to mandate marriage equality
through the Constitution,'95 that the generation that ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to extend to
regulation of marriage in this way,' 96 that extending marriage to
same-sex couples threatens religious liberty,1 97 or that same-sex
relationships are immoral or may validly be treated as such by the
state.' 98 Should this hypothetical dissenting judge's further
argument that substantive due process "distorts the constitutional
text"1 99 depend on whether he or she agrees that it is a textual
contradiction? I think not, just as advancing the argument that the
Obergefell Court has repeated the errors of Dred Scott" should
not depend on whether the judge believes Dred Scott was
erroneous. If it has become a conventional view of the law-
consuming public (including members of the legal profession and
other professional elites who form the core of the judge's
audience) that substantive due process is a textual distortion and
that Dred Scott was wrong, then those propositions are part of our
constitutional law and are therefore resources for use in
constitutional argument. The judge who avails herself of those
resources in the course of adjudicative exposition engages in an
act of translation.
195. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
196. See id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
198. See Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., 1140460, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, 138
(Ala., Mar. 5, 2015) (per curiam) ("It seems at least disingenuous to find a constitutional
infirmity with traditional marriage laws by way of a moral judgment when states have been
forced to defend those laws apart from any moral or religious basis, an especially difficult
task given that American ideas of marriage indisputably have been shaped by the Jewish
and Christian religions.").
199. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). My use of Justice
Thomas's words in Obergefell should not be taken to suggest any skepticism that Justice
Thomas believes what he said.
200. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Hold the rotten eggs and tomatoes until an important
objection is addressed. My French-speaking professor began to
use "meeting" rather than rendezvous because he was trying
earnestly to articulate his intended meaning to his students. He
was not trying to communicate something that he did not believe,
and he was not trying to persuade his students of anything. The
usage of constitutional memes that I am offering shares the first
feature by hypothesis. In the Obergefell hypothetical, the judge is
trying to communicate a proposition of constitutional law that the
judge sincerely believes: the Constitution does not require state
recognition of same-sex marriage. The language in which he is
doing so has no abstract meaning (as rendezvous has no abstract
meaning); it has an acquired constitutional meaning that it is
rhetorically useful for the judge to invoke. In so doing the judge
is engaging the reader as a participant in exposition, as any good
translator does.201
And as constitutional law requires. The line of division
between communication and persuasion is one the epistemology
of constitutional law does not recognize. It is widely agreed
among constitutional scholars that propositions of constitutional
law acquire their permanence through public acceptance.202 As
Richard Fallon writes, "the legal legitimacy of the Constitution
depends much more on its present sociological acceptance (and
thus its sociological legitimacy) than upon the (questionable)
legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental elements of
the constitutional order, including practices of constitutional
interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current
sociological acceptance." 203 If this is true, then successful rhetoric
is a legal obligation of a constitutional judge.20
201. Cf. Fuller, supra note 34, at 383 ("The desire to keep the form of the law
persuasive is frequently the impulse to preserve a form of statement which will make the
law acceptable to those who do not have the time or the capacity for understanding reasons
which are not obvious-and this class sometimes includes the author of the statement
himself.").
202. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007);
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621,653
(1987) (arguing that the legal authority of judicial precedent rests on public acceptance).
203. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1792 (2005).
204. Whether the structure of knowledge in legal domains outside of constitutional
law imposes similar obligations on adjudicators is beyond the scope of this Essay. Cf.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (developing and defending a distinctive
approach to legal positivism).
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CONCLUSION
Constitutional memes are entrenched-indeed, are self-
reinforcing-but they are not permanent. It was once hornbook
law that rights could be divided into distinct civil, political, or
social rights.205 We no longer think of rights in those terms, and
the categories were overlapping and internally inconsistent even
during Reconstruction, the heyday of the tripartite scheme. 206 This
change in legal understanding did not occur because of an
intervening constitutional amendment, Supreme Court decision,
or other change in substantive constitutional law. What changed
was the conventional public expression of rights, as the language
of rights increasingly came to represent an aspiration towards
universal moral equality. Substantive due process might not
always be thought incompatible with the constitutional text, and
indeed this Essay can be understood, in part, as a step towards
that end.
That said, the Essay is itself a paradox. It seeks to expose
fallacies in the textual argument against substantive due process
but it is neither a defense of substantive due process as a
constitutional doctrine nor even a criticism of the textual
argument. The way to square this circle is to understand the Essay
as a kind of defense of fallacies. Constructing and relying upon
constitutional memes that serve one's rhetorical purposes is part
of what it means to advance arguments in the real world that
constitutional law regulates. Scholars can and should deconstruct
old ideas, but judges may be forgiven if they haven't the time.
205. See RICHARD A. PRIMus, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 154 (1999).
206. See id.
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